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VFR Flight Into IMC 
VFR FLIGHT INTO IMC: REDUCING THE HAZARD 
Dale R. Wilson and Teresa A. Sloan 
ABSTRACT 
Aircraft accidents resulting from initiating or continuing visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological 
conditions (IMC) continue to be one of the leading causes of fatal aircraft accidents. This paper outlines the nature and 
scope of this hazard and reviews past and present initiatives designed to reduce it. It also suggests future interventions 
that may be effective in reducing the threat of this aviation hazard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aircraft accidents resulting from initiating or 
continuing visual flight rules (VFR) flight into instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) is one of the leading 
causes of fatal aircraft accidents. When VFR-into-IMC 
accident pilots inadvertently enter cloud, they either fly 
under controlled flight into terrain (CFTT) or experience 
spatial disorientation and lose control of the aircraft 
resulting in an unrecoverable unusual flight attitude (e.g., 
spin or graveyard spiral) or inflight structural failure. 
Studies conducted at the University of Illinois indicate that 
for the pilot who does not have adequate instrument flight 
training, the average time from cloud entry to loss of 
control or ground impact is 178 seconds ("178 seconds," 
n.d.). Unfortunately, the accident record indicates that VFR 
flight into IMC continues to be a significant threat to 
aviation safety. This paper outlines the nature and scope of 
the hazard, reviews past and present initiatives designed to 
reduce it, and suggests future interventions which may be 
effective in reducing this aviation hazard. VFR-into-IMC 
Accident Record 
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) found that during the twelve years through 1975 to 
1986, even though VFR flight into IMC accounted for only 
4% of U.S. general aviation (GA) accidents, it was 
responsible for 16.7% and 19% of fatal GA accidents and 
fatalities respectively (NTSB, 1989). For a similar time 
period in Canada (1976 to 1985), the Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada (TSBC) found that continued VFR flight 
into IMC accounted for only 6% of all aviation accidents 
yet was responsible for 23% of fatal accidents and 26% of 
fatalities, making it the leading single cause of aviation 
fatalities in that country (TSBC, 1990a). During this 
period, a combined total of approximately 1770 
VFR-into-IMC accidents occurred in both countries, 
averaging one accident and 1.5 fatalities every two days 
(NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 1990a). Similar findings are reported 
for the United Kingdom (UK) where continued flight into 
adverse weather was responsible for an average of 24% of 
all single-engine aircraft accidents for the 15 years between 
1980 and 1994, and one-third of all fatal GA accidents in 
1994 alone (Leannount, 1995). 
These data indicate that even though the incidence 
of VFR-into-IMC accidents is quite low, they are 
responsible for a disproportionately high percentage of fatal 
accidents and fatalities. For example, the NTSB study 
(1989) found 17.3% of all GA accidents resulted in 
fatalities, yet a full 72.2% of VFR-into-IMC accidents were 
fatal. A recent Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
(AOPA) Air Safety Foundation (1996) study of 
VFR-into-IMC accidents, which occurred between 1982 
and 1993, found an even higher percentage (82%) of these 
accidents involved fatalities. 
Even though the percentage of U.S. GA 
VFR-into-IMC accidents dropped from 4% in 1982 to 3% 
by 1993-which reflects the overall decline in 
weather-related accidents from 31% in 1982 to 20% in 
1993 (AOPA, 1996)~there is evidence that it may have 
leveled off. A recent weather safety study conducted by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) found the 
percentage of weather-related accidents to total accidents 
remains stable at 23% since 1995 (FAA, n.d.). Since 
approximately 70% 
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of fetal GA weather-related accidents result from attempted 
VFR flight into IMC (AOPA, 1999, 2001), it is likely that 
this leveling off in the proportion of weather-related 
accidents reflects an overall leveling off of the 
VFR-into-IMC accident rate as well. Regardless, recent 
data make it clear that VFR flight into IMC is still the 
leading cause of fetal G A weather-related accidents and 
continues to be one of the most frequent causes of all 
fatal GA accidents (AOPA 19%, 2001). Type of Flight 
Operations 
Many VFR-into-IMC accidents involve G A aircraft used 
primarily for personal purposes and piloted mostly by 
relatively low-time pilots. For example, of the 361 
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States between 
1983 and early 1987,62% of pilots were flying their own 
aircraft and 75% of the accident flights were for personal 
purposes (NTSB, 1989). Between 1989 and 1999, the 
FAA found that 71% of 14 CFR Part 91 aircraft involved 
in weather-related accidents were used for personal 
purposes (FAA, n.d). The AOPA Air Safety Foundation 
(1996) also reported that 58% of G A VFR-into-IMC 
accident pilots had fewer than one thousand hours of flight 
experience. However, only 5% had fewer than one 
hundred hours, presumably because these pilots fly 
mostly under the supervision of a flight instructor in a 
relatively protected training environment. 
However, these accidents are not solely restricted 
to low-time GA pilots—a surprisingly high proportion 
involve experienced pilots and those engaged in 
commercial flight operations. One-third of GA 
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States involved 
pilots with one thousand flight hours or more and 
one-quarter involved pilots with over two thousand 
hours. In Canada, almost 20% of the accident pilots had 
three thousand or more hours of flight experience 
(AOPA, 19%; NTSB, 1989, TSBC, 1990a). Recent 
studies also indicate that a significant portion of CFTT 
accidents—the world's leading cause of commercial 
aviation fatalities (Menzel, 1998)-are the result of 
attempted VFR flight into IMC. Khatwa and Roelen 
(19%) found that VFR flight into IMC was responsible 
for at least 19% of worldwide commercial CFTT accidents 
that occurred between 1988 and 1994. (The percentage is 
likely higher since data were missing in 43% of the sample 
accidents.) An even higher percentage is reported in 
Canada where over half of the seventy commercial 
CFTT accidents between 1984 and 1994 involved flight 
crews attempting visual flight in IMC (TSBC, 19%). 
Commercial flight operations in Canada shared a 
significant proportion of that country's VFR-into-IMC 
accidents~a full 35% over a ten-year period (TSBC, 
1990a). In the United States, Alaska has the worst record 
for VFR-into-IMC accidents, not only in the GA sector but 
for commercial flight operations as well (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. VFR-into-IMC accident rates for five-year period 1989 though 1993. Adapted from Safety study: Aviation safety in 
Alaska (NTSB/SS-95/03), (p. 24), 1995, Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board. 
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For the five-year period between 1989 and 1993, these 
accidents were responsible for 47% and 67% of Alaska's 
fatal air taxi and commuter accidents respectively (NTSB, 
1995). In fact, a recent study conducted by the U.S. 
National Institute for Occupational Safely and Health 
(NIOSH) found that aircraft accidents are the leading cause 
of occupational fatalities in Alaska, and that CFTT resulting 
from attempted flight into IMC is the number one cause of 
these accidents (Hall, 19%; LaBelle, 1999). 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
Adverse Weather 
A number of environmental factors increase the 
probability of VFR-into-IMC accidents. The first obvious 
factor is adverse weather in the form of cloud, precipitation, 
or fog. VFR flight dictates that minimum cloud clearance 
and visibility requirements be met, and for certain flight 
operations (e.g., 14 CFR Part 135 VFR helicopter 
operations in the United States) and countries (such as 
Canada) visual contact with the earth's surface must be 
maintained. Mountainous Terrain 
Adding mountainous terrain to VFR flight in 
marginal weather substantially increases the risk. Over half 
of all VFR-into-IMC accidents for a ten-year period in 
Canada occurred in mountainous terrain (TSBC, 1990b). 
Also, 62% of foreign-registered VFR-into-IMC accidents in 
Canada occurred in the mountainous regions of British 
Columbia (BC) and the Yukon Territory (TSBC, 1990b). 
Over the most recent ten-year period for which data is 
available (1991-2000), British Columbia continued to have 
the highest number of fatal accidents-about 39% more 
than Ontario, the province with the highest number of total 
accidents (TSBC, 2001). 
Of the ten U.S. states that had the highest percentage 
of VFR-into-IMC accidents between 1975 and 1986, eight 
are located in FAA-designated mountainous areas (NTSB, 
1989). For fiscal years 1989-1993, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (USGAO) found the GA accident rate 
for the eleven western continental states (all 
FAA-designated mountainous areas) averaged 2.4 
accidents per 100,000 operations- 40% higher than the 
rate of 1.7 for the other thirty-seven continental states 
(USGAO, 1993). Also, the average rate for Hawaii and 
Alaska-both within designated mountainous 
areas-exceeded the 1.7 rate by 39% and 580% 
respectively (USGAO, 1993). 
Mountain ranges located in western North America 
act as natural lifting agents for moist air moving inland 
from the Pacific Ocean. When the base of overcast cloud 
drops below the mountaintops, a giant labyrinth consisting 
of a limited number of narrow winding corridors results. 
For the pilot who attempts VFR flight under the cloud, a 
practice often referred to as scud running, the lack of 
remaining available options (i.e., VFR over-the-top, IFR 
clearance, reverse course) substantially increases the risk. 
Pilots can inadvertently fly into a dead-end valley where 
terrain rises faster than the aircraft can climb or get boxed 
into a narrow valley with little or no room to perform a 
180-degree turn. Also, rapidly changing mountain weather 
can close in behind pilots leaving them no way out. Night 
Another important environmental factor that 
increases the level of risk is the darkness of night. There is 
an increased chance of inadvertent entry into cloud or fog 
at night (AOPA, 1996; Wilson, 1999). A full third of all 
VFR-into-IMC accidents in the United States and 30% of 
such accidents in Canada occur at night, even though the 
estimated GA VFR activity in both countries at night is 
only about 10% (AOPA, 1996, NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 
1990b). Also, the major cause of fatal commercial 
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) helicopter accidents 
over a nine-year period was VFR flight into IMC, with 
most occurring at night (NTSB, 1988). Even in good visual 
meteorological conditions (VMC) there is an increased 
accident risk for VFR flight at night (Wilson, 1999). How 
much more is the risk in adverse weather? As the following 
account illustrates, it can be very difficult to detect 
inclement weather at night. 
I left XYZ later than I originally intended. In retrospect, 
I should not have left at a time that would require night 
VFR flight, given the cloud conditions. . . .  I did not notice 
entering IMC at first, and, in fact, remember being 
curious why the anti-collision lights were illuminating 
the cockpit and causing a strobe effect on the prop. 
Shortly thereafter, I noticed that the turn coordinator was 
pegged in a left turn, the attitude indicator showed a 
45-60° left bank, the directional gyro was spinning 
rapidly. . . .  I recognized the signs of [an impending] 
"graveyard spiral" and was able to return the plane to 
straight-and-level flight. The real cause [of this incident] 
was ... lack of appreciation of the danger of night VFR. 
("Night for Day," 19%, p. 1) A number of initiatives 
have been undertaken to reduce the VFR-into-IMC 
hazard. These have focused 
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primarily on: 1.) regulatory reforms, 2.) improving the 
operational environment, 3.) developing advanced 
technology, and 4.) enhancing pilot training and 
education. 
REGULATORY REFORMS 
VFR Weather Minima 
In both the United States and Canada, 
VFR-into-IMC accidents have occurred in meteorological 
conditions which met or exceeded the minimum 
regulatory requirements ("Night-visual flight rules," 
1989; TSBC, 1990b, 19%). These mininuuns have also 
been cited as a contributing factor in some of these 
accidents (TSBC, 19%). Investigators, citing scientific 
data regarding the inherent limitations of human 
depth/distance perception and information processing 
ability, conclude that when pilots fly in the impoverished 
visual conditions of marginal VFR weather, it is virtually 
impossible not only to accurately judge one mile visibility 
from a moving aircraft, but to detect deteriorating 
conditions in time to avoid inadvertent flight into IMC 
(TSBC, 1996). Just as automobile drivers can overdrive 
their headlights when driving at night, precluding them 
from detecting objects in sufficient time to avoid a 
collision, so too is it easy for pilots to overfly their 
visibility when flying in conditions of reduced visibility. 
Exacerbating the problem is the phenomenon of aerial 
perspective, where distances from objects and terrain tend 
to be overestimated in conditions of reduced visibility 
(Ross, 1975). Also, in mountainous terrain maneuvering 
room is minimal when flying through narrow valleys under 
an overcast cloud deck. The increase in turning radius 
which occurs at the higher altitudes usually associated 
with mountain flying makes it difficult for pilots to safely 
execute a ISO-degree course reversal should one be 
required. 
Regulatory agencies have recognized the 
inadequate margin of safety provided by traditional VFR. 
weather minima. For example, in 1989 the United States 
raised the minimum of one mile visibility (and clear of 
cloud) applicable to VFR flights in uncontrolled (class G) 
airspace at night, to the higher controlled airspace (class C, 
D & E) minimum of three miles visibility (with minimum 
horizontal/vertical cloud clearance distances) 
("Night-visual flight rules," 1989). Canada followed suit in 
19% by raising the one-mile visibility requirement to three 
miles in uncontrolled airspace at night (Transport Canada, 
1996a). For special VFR operations at night, both the 
United States (under Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 
[14 CFR]) and 
UK require pilots and their aircraft to be certified for 
instrument flight, and Canada now only authorizes it for 
the purpose of getting the aircraft safely on the ground (14 
CFR 91.157(b), 2000; Transport Canada, 1996b). In 
response to the dramatic increase in air tour accidents in 
the state of Hawaii, the FAA also published Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation (SFAR) Number 71-1, which 
effectively increases the weather minima by requiring VFR 
flights to operate above 1500 feet AGL ("Air tour 
operators," 1994). However, even though commercial VFR 
Part 135 air carriers require two miles visibility and 
recreational pilots are restricted to three, the basic visibility 
in uncontrolled airspace for day VFR operations in the 
United States still remains at one statute mile (14 CFR 
135.205(a), 1991; 14 CFR 91.155(a), 1993; 14 CFR 
61.101(d), 1997). 
Recognizing the increased risk for VFR flight 
operations in mountainous terrain and in response to TSBC 
recommendation A90-67 (1990a), Canada raised the 
minimum visibility requirement to two miles in designated 
mountainous regions, then subsequently expanded the rule 
to apply to all uncontrolled airspace below 1,000 feet AGL 
during daylight hours (Transport Canada, 1996a; TSBC, 
19%). Other countries have higher visibility requirements 
for day VFR flight in uncontrolled airspace. For example, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK require a minimum of 
three statute miles visibility (Civil Aviation Authority of 
New Zealand, 2002; Civil Aviation Safety Authority of 
Australia, 2002; United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, 
19%). The FAA may wish to consider the safety benefits of 
increasing the minimum visibility requirement for day VFR 
operations, if not for all low-level uncontrolled airspace, 
then at least for designated mountainous regions. 
Single-engine Commercial IFR Flight 
A regulatory change that should lead to fewer 
fatalities involves allowing commercial passenger-carrying 
flights to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR) in 
single-engine aircraft. Canada has allowed single-engine 
IFR (SEIFR) passenger-carrying flights in turbine-powered 
aircraft since 1993 ("Commercial passenger-carrying," 
1997; Transport Canada, 1996c). The United States 
followed suit in 1998 by allowing commercial SEIFR 
passenger-carrying operations in both turbine and 
reciprocating engine aircraft, provided minimum 
equipment and maintenance requirements are met 
("Commercial passenger-carrying," 1997). Noting that 
VFR flight into IMC was the most significant cause of fatal 
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commercial EMS helicopter accidents (NTSB, 1988) and 
14 CFR Part 135 operator accidents in Alaska (NTSB, 
1995), as well as a serious problem nation-wide, the FAA 
reasoned this hazard far outweighed the risks associated 
with an engine failure in IMC ("Commercial 
passenger-carrying," 1997). The option to conduct an 
BFR flight provides the benefits of the IFR system (i.e., 
safe obstacle clearance altitudes, ATC position following 
and assistance, availability of en route weather information, 
etc.) as well as a higher altitude from which to glide in the 
unlikely event of an engine failure-benefits which would 
otherwise be unavailable to the pilot when flying VFR at 
low altitudes below the clouds. 
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Aviation Weather Services 
In order to make safe preflight and inflight decisions 
regarding the suitability of weather for VFR flight, pilots 
need accurate, comprehensive, and up-to-the-minute 
weather information specific to their route of flight. 
Unfortunately, this information has not always been 
available. In the United States, for example, the FAA is 
strongly criticized for not providing the leadership 
necessary to ensure the delivery of adequate weather 
information to pilots, controllers, and other users of the 
aviation system. Since 1995, at least four major reports 
have been critical of the lack of coordination between the 
FAA and the National Weather Service (NWS) which has 
resulted in a "fragmented'' aviation weather system that at 
times is "unable to respond fully to the valid needs of pilots 
and other users" (National Research Council [NRC], 1995, 
p. 3; FAA Research, 1997; USGAO, 1998). 
Since the consolidation of 317 Flight Service Stations 
(FSSs) in 1981 to the 61 Automated FSSs (AFSS) and 31 
part-time and/or seasonal FSSs by the mid-1990s, many 
question the FAA's commitment to providing an equal or 
better level of service to users (NRC, 1995). The 
replacement of FAA and NWS weather briefers, who 
possess expert knowledge of local weather conditions, with 
an expanding automated surface observation system 
(ASOS) is also viewed by many aviation users as a 
degradation of service (NRC, 1995; USGAO, 1998). For 
example, ceiling and visibility values-both of which are 
critical elements to VFR pilots—are measured differently by 
ASOS and under certain conditions (e.g., rapidly changing 
weather) are inaccurate. ASOS measures ceiling over a 
narrow area directly overhead rather than over the entire 
celestial dome, and visibility is determined by the opacity 
of air between a transmitter and receiver located less than 
three feet apart (NRC, 1995). 
The NRC (1995) recommended the FAA take action 
to address three identified aviation user needs: improved 
weather observations and forecasts; the distribution of 
graphic weather products "that allow pilots, controllers, 
and dispatchers to develop and maintain a consistent view 
of current and forecast weather conditions" (p. 39); and 
better weather training for pilots, controllers, and FSS 
personnel. Even though a USGAO report rated their 
progress as "very poor" (USGAO, 1998, p. 18), the FAA, 
through its Safer Skies and Safe Flight 21 initiatives, is 
addressing these weaknesses (FAA GA Joint Steering 
Committee, 2001; FAA Office of Safe Flight 21,2002) 
Air Traffic Control 
VFR pilots may be reluctant to declare an emergency 
and request ATC assistance to escape the possibility of a 
CFIT accident resulting from scud running below the 
clouds or to get themselves safely down from above a solid 
overcast sky condition. It is not known to what extent the 
threat of disciplinary action has precluded pilots who were 
legitimately in trouble from requesting assistance. Most 
certainly, if a pilot requests priority assistance from ATC in 
the United States, the local FAA Flight Standards District 
Office (FSDO) will be notified and they in turn are obliged 
to conduct an investigation. However, pilots need to realize 
that the FAA is well aware that some pilots may be more 
afraid of confessing their need for help than they are of the 
actual condition itself. Therefore, to encourage pilots to 
take whatever steps necessary to achieve a safe outcome for 
a flight, including requesting a flight assist from ATC in an 
emergency (or urgency) situation, they rarely take 
enforcement action unless absolutely necessary (BertoreUi, 
n.d.; FAA, 2000). They prefer to talk with pilots (by 
telephone or in person) to help them avoid such situations 
in the future. Only if it is clearly a case of willful careless 
or reckless operation of the aircraft, or the person is a 
repeat offender, will they issue a warning or take 
enforcement action (BertoreUi, n.d.; FAA, 2000). 
TECHNOLOGY 
Weather Data Delivery 
New advancements in cockpit technology have the 
potential to provide significant safety benefits to GA pilots. 
One of the goals of the FAA's Safer Skies and Safeflight 21 
programs (initiated in 1998 and 2000 respectively) is to 
increase the availability of accurate inflight weather data 
through technology which is "affordable by a significant 
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portion of the GA fleet by 2007" (FAA GA Joint Steering 
Committee, 2001, para. 3). The FAA's Flight Information 
Service Data Link (FISDL), which provides nationwide 
VHP frequencies for transmission of real-time weather 
data, became operational in August 2000. The two 
FAA-contracted service providers-ARNAV Systems and 
Honeywell International—provide the ground infrastructure 
for the data link. Aircraft equipped with the appropriate 
receiver and multi-function display (MFD) can receive 
textual weather products (METARs, TAFs, etc.) at no 
charge and graphic information, such as NEXRAD radar 
images, for a nominal fee (Goyer, 2000). The cost to the 
consumer for receiver/MFD systems range from about 
$8,000 to $13,500 (ARNAV Systems, 2001; Bendix/King, 
n.d.)-certainly lower than comparable systems installed in 
commercial air carrier aircraft, yet still likely not affordable 
for many GA aircraft owners. 
Alaska and Canada have experimented, to a limited 
degree, with providing video camera images of real-time 
weather conditions in remote mountainous areas to VFR 
pilots. Expanding such coverage, especially in mountainous 
regions, would provide VFR pilots with valuable real-time 
weather information that might otherwise be unavailable. 
In the United States it is conceivable that such images 
could be delivered to VFR pilots through the FISDL 
system, thus enhancing their decision making ability. 
Terrain Awareness 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and advancements 
in computer-chip technology have contributed to the 
proliferation of terrain awareness technology for GA 
aircraft. This technology can be used as an aid to increase 
the situational awareness of pilots who may find themselves 
flying in marginal visual conditions. Most units display 
terrain information derived from GPS position information 
synchronized with a worldwide terrain elevation database. 
For example, the Echo Flight system uses Landsat terrain 
imagery to provide a color display that can actually help a 
pilot to distinguish open areas from areas with buildings or 
trees even in IMC or at night (Echo Flight, 2002). UPS 
Aviation Technologies, Honeywell's Bendix/King, and 
other manufacturers offer comparable systems, with some 
providing visual and aural warning of terrain through an 
Early Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) 
(Nordwall, 2000). The price for this technology ranges 
from as low as $6,000 to about $15,000 (Echo Flight, 2002; 
UPS Aviation Technologies, 2002). 
Synthetic Vision 
Technology that ultimately holds out the most 
promise for VFR pilots is synthetic vision (S V). Using GPS 
position information and an accurate terrain database, SV 
provides the pilot with a high fidelity virtual-reality display 
of the outside world. A variety of systems are currently 
being developed. Some present information in a 
three-dimensional moving display while others will 
provide an out-the-window view with highway in the sky 
(HITS) overlays (Braukus & Barnstorff, 1999; Sakrison, 
2001). Theoretically such technology (and its costs) could 
evolve to the point where the typical VFR pilot could look 
directly out the window in IMC and/or at night and view 
an accurate, realistic, and reliable computer-generated 
visual scene of the outside workL Although these first 
generation systems are designed to attract the general 
aviation market, costs are likely to initially be high for 
the typical GA aircraft owner. 
PILOT TRAINING 
Instrument Rating 
In 1985, even though 46% of U.S. pilot certificate 
holders possessed an instrument rating, only 23% of the 
VFR-into-MC accidents between 1975 and 1986, and 27% 
between 1982 and 1993, involved pilots with instrument 
ratings (AOPA, 1996; NTSB, 1989; TSBC, 1990a). Also, 
between 1976 and 1985, U.S. commercial pilots, 83% of 
whom were instrument-rated in 1985, were proportionally 
involved in significantly fewer VFR-into-IMC accidents 
than their counterparts in Canada, where only 15% were 
instrument-rated (TSBC, 1990a). In 1997, the FAA 
eliminated the 125-hour total time requirement under 14 
CFR Part 61.61 ("Pilot, Flight Instructor," 1997). 
According to Scott Gardiner (personal communication, 
April 26, 2002), Safety Program Manager at the Seattle 
FSDO, low time pilots who meet the practical test 
standards for an instrument rating, and who obtain and use 
that rating, are less likely to scud run. VFR pilots should 
recognize the increased safety benefits of instrument 
training and possession of an instrument rating, and the 
aviation educational community should do all in its power 
to promote and facilitate such training. Risk Awareness 
Training 
In an effort to attract customers and to extol the 
aviation safety record to the public, the aviation industry 
has unwittingly been responsible for promulgating what 
John King calls the Big Lie regarding GA safety (Wallace, 
2001). This is most often illustrated in the statement; The 
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most dangerous part of the flight is the drive to the airport." 
The fact is, even though the GA accident rate per mile is 
about one-tenth that of the motor vehicle rate, the fatal 
accident rate is about seven times higher (AOPA, 1999). 
Rather than shy away from discussions about risk, flight 
instructors and aviation educators should be educating 
students about the varying degrees of risk inherent in 
specific flight operations. Informing pilots of the 
probabilities, consequences, and situations in which 
VFR-into-IMC accidents are likely is a necessary first 
step in teaching them how to reduce the risks associated 
with VFR flight in marginal weather conditions. 
Hazardous Weather Awareness Training 
To avoid hazardous weather, VFR pilots must be able 
to recognize it, both through personal observation and the 
proper interpretation of aviation weather forecasts and 
reports. Not only does this require a significant level of 
understanding of meteorological processes and weather 
hazards to flight, but also the ability to generate adequate 
predictions of future weather based on personal 
observations and aviation weather reports. The training 
necessary to achieve this certainly goes far beyond the 
minimum Private Pilot ground school requirements 
specified by most regulatory agencies. Collegiate aviation 
programs are ideally suited to provide this type of training. 
College-level aviation weather courses not only provide an 
opportunity for a deeper understanding of meteorology and 
the weather hazards peculiar to the flight environment, but 
also the practical application of this knowledge through 
simulated cross-country exercises integrated with weather 
service products designed to help students determine the 
suitability of weather for VFR flight. 
The FAA Private Pilot Airmen Knowledge Test, 
designed to test the level of an applicant's knowledge, is 
considerably weak in this area. It wasn't until 1999 that 
questions (only two) dealing with continued VFR flight into 
adverse weather were finally introduced. However, the 
databank continues to be heavily biased toward convective 
and turbulence hazards and includes only one question on 
low-pressure systems (altimeter errors). None specifically 
identify warm frontal weather-both of which are associated 
with extensive areas of low ceilings and visibilities 
common to many VFR-into-IMC accidents (FAA, 2002). A 
significant increase in the number of questions which seek 
to apply weather theory to practical situations, such as 
integrating weather report and forecast questions with a 
sample cross-country trip (as is done in Private Pilot 
knowledge tests in Canada), would also contribute to the 
elevation of weather competency among newly certified 
pilots. 
Weather-Related Decision Making Training 
The fact remains that either actively or by default, 
pilots involved in these accidents made the decision to 
initiate or continue VFR flight into adverse weather. 
Human decision making has received considerable 
attention by researchers over the past three decades, with a 
subdiscipline developed and devoted strictly to aviation 
known as aeronautical decision making (ADM). 
Unfortunately, research has yielded few definitive findings 
about this most complex of human thought processes. What 
little has been discovered has also taken considerable time 
to make its way into pilot training programs. 
There is a substantial body of research that indicates 
normal human decision making is often not very rational 
and is subject to bias. For example, Wichman and Ball 
(1983) and CVHare (1990) found that most GA pilots are 
unrealistically optimistic regarding their chances of 
experiencing an aircraft accident, and believe they possess 
greater flying skill and are less likely to experience an 
aircraft accident or take risks in flight, than their peers. 
Wilson and Fallshore (2001) discovered these optimistic 
and ability biases also extend to the VFR-into-IMC 
scenario. They found that most VFR pilots are overly 
optimistic regarding their chances of experiencing a 
VFR-into-IMC accident, and are also overconfident in 
their ability to both avoid and successfully fly out of IMC. 
When evaluating all 14 CFRPart 91 aircraft accidents 
between 1990 and 1997, Gob and Wiegmann (2001) also 
found a significantly greater percentage of VFR-into-IMC 
accident flights carried passengers on board. In Alaska, 
50% of commercial pilots and operators surveyed flew 
under VFR into IMC at least once in response to 
operational pressures (NTSB, 1995). The role of social 
pressure, along with how other decision biases may 
contribute to what has historically been called 
get-there-itis, is currently being examined by researchers 
and will hopefully shed more light on why VFR pilots 
continue to press on into deteriorating weather conditions. 
Aviation educators and flight instructors play a key 
role in teaching their students how to avoid a 
VFR-into-IMC situation. One way is to simulate 
hazardous weather recognition and weather-related 
decision making through pencil and paper exercises, 
computer-based training (CBT), and one-on-one or group 
discussions. The FAA, AOPA, 
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and other organizations are beginning to provide training 
aids to help pilots in this area. The FAA sponsors an 
experimental web site (http://flysafe.faa.gov) which, 
through its Pilot Mastery Series, provides CD ROM and 
on-line CBT programs designed to help VFR pilots visually 
recognize the signs of deteriorating weather, determine how 
to make decisions in such weather, and set personal 
weather minimums for flight. It is hoped the development 
of such programs will continue and eventually be 
incorporated into the mainstream of pilot education 
programs delivered by industry and the FAA. 
Finally, modeling a healthy respect for marginal 
weather and legal VFR weather minima teaches students by 
example how to avoid adverse weather. However, since it 
is likely that pilots will encounter such weather once they 
leave the relatively safe confines of the flight-training 
environment, there may be value in providing some actual 
marginal-VFR weather training to pilots. Deliberately 
exposing them to close-to-VFR-minimums could help them 
both recognize adverse weather conditions and learn the 
skills required to avoid inadvertent flight into IMC. The 
dangers of scud running below clouds, especially at night 
or in mountainous terrain, might also be more effectively 
emphasized. However, there is the danger of setting a poor 
example and possibly elevating the future risk-taking 
behavior of these trainees. Therefore, it should be made 
clear to them that this is specialized hazardous weather 
avoidance training, and regular flight training in such 
weather conditions should not take place. 
CONCLUSION 
VFR flight into IMC remains the leading cause of 
fatal G A weather-related accidents and continues to be one 
of the most frequent causes of all fatal GA accidents. Even 
though much has been done to reduce the frequency of 
these accidents, continued regulatory reforms and 
improvements in the operational environment, technology, 
and pilot training will further reduce the threat of this 
hazard. In that spirit, the following recommendations are 
made: Recommendations to FAA 
1. The FAA should consider following the example of 
other countries by increasing the minimum daytime VFR 
visibility requirement to at least 2 miles in uncontrolled 
(Class G) airspace below 1200 feet AGL. 
2. The FAA should continue its efforts to improve the 
quality of weather delivery to pilots including facilitating 
the development of technology that provides real-time in- 
cockpit  weather  information,   especially  in  
remote mountainous areas. 
3. The FAA should increase the number of TV weather 
cameras in remote mountainous regions and make these 
images available to pilots via the Internet. 
4. The FAA should increase the number of Private Pilot 
Airman Knowledge test questions that specifically deal 
with continued VFR flight into deteriorating weather 
conditions and the adverse weather associated with warm 
frontal and low pressure systems. Questions that integrate 
specific weather report and forecast elements that are 
applicable to a sample cross-country trip would also elevate 
the level of knowledge required of test applicants. 
5. The FAA should continue its efforts regarding on-line 
training aids such as tiieflysafe.faa.gov experimental web 
site. 
Recommendations to Industry 
1. Part 135 VFR operators should consider taking 
advantage of the 1998 changes to 14 CFR Part 135 that 
allow operators, with certain stipulations, to fly SEIFR, 
thereby providing an extra margin of safety. 
2. The aerospace industry and the FAA should continue 
to cooperate in the development of affordable cockpit 
technology and weather data delivery systems that will 
significantly increase safety for the low-end of the GA 
market. Recommendations for Training 
1. VFR Pilots should be taught how to determine their 
own personal weather minimums for flight and the 
importance of adhering to them when faced with the 
pressure to fly below them. 
2. Pilots should be encouraged to pursue their instrument 
rating once the Private Pilot certificate has been earned. 
3. Flight instructors should be truthful and should not 
minimize the risks involved in flying an aircraft. Presenting 
the risks involved in specific flight situations, including the 
risks associated with scud running, should be accompanied 
by an explanation of risk management concepts. 
4. Flight instructors should incorporate hazardous 
weather avoidance procedures applicable to the VFR-into- 
IMC scenario into their teaching. 
5. Pilots should be taught not to allow the fear of 
certificate action to outweigh the need to request assistance. 
Teaching pilots to ask ATC or FSS for a "flight assist" and 
explaining the probable outcomes of such a request can 
help alleviate such fears. 
6. Aviation psychologists and educators should continue 
  
Page 36 JAAER, Fall 2003 
8
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 13, No. 1 [2003], Art. 9
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol13/iss1/9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2003.1567
VFR Flight Into IMC 
research into the various aspects of ADM and their findings 
should be incorporated into pilot training programs. •> 
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